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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the impact of some government policies - namely
entry liberalization and export subsidy - on the levels of domestic R&D.
Domestic industries, especially in less developed countries, have often
been protected. Such protectionism has been criticised on many grounds in
the literature. It has been argued that not only does such protectionism lead
to cost inefficiencies, but it also leads to a slower development of new tech-
nologies, thus widening the gap between the developed and the developing
nations. It is also argued that a reduction in the level of such protectionism
would, through an increased level of domestic competition, lead to an in-
crease in the level of domestic R&D. It is the primary goal of this paper to
examine the links between the levels of R&D and protectionism in a formal
context.
We consider a domestic oligopoly where the firms can sell either in the
domestic market, or in the foreign market. Since we are mainly interested
in the problems of the less developed countries (LDCs from now on), we
assume that the domestic firms are small relative to the world market, i.e.
the domestic firms are price takers in the world market. We examine a two
stage oligolpoly model, where, in the first stage the firms compete on the
levels of R&D, and then, in the second stage, they compete in the product
market.
Before proceeding with the results let us note that there are some other
interesting problems that can be formulated in this framework. The first
question examines what is the crucial bottleneck in domestic R&D, incen-
tives, or the access to to foreign technology. If, in equilibrium, the domestic
firms use their most efficient technology, then we say that there are no in-
centive problems, it is the access to technology that is the crucial bottleneck.
If, on the other hand, the firms use a less than efficient level of R&D, then
we say that there is an incentives problem and access to technology is not a
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binding constraint.
Our exercise also has some relation to the transfer of technology debate
in the Indian literature. While some authors suggest that the foreign firms
dump inefficient technologies on their Indian counterparts, others suggest
that they sell the vintage that they themselves are currently using.1 While
our model is concerned with the direct entry by the foreign firms themselves,
and not with technology transfer per se, we can ask whether these foreign
firms will perform R&D at an ‘efficient’ level or not.
We also examine the impact of entry on exports, as well as on domestic
output. Agarwal and Barua (1994), as well as Marjit and Raychaudhuri
(1997) demonstrate, in a model that is very similar to our own, that as a
result of entry both exports and aggregate output would increase. Their
model, however, does not take the R&D stage into account. It is of interest
to examine if similar results go through even in the presence of R&D.
We then briefly describe our main results. Interestingly enough, we find
that the R&D levels of the firms can be linked to their performance in the
product market. For firms that sell in the domestic market alone, the R&D
is always chosen at their most efficient level. For firms that sell in both the
markets, however, the results are more complex. We find that these firms
may or may not choose their most efficient technology. Thus for firms that
sell in the domestic market alone there are no incentive problems, the only
problem lies in obtaining an access to better technology. For the other firms,
however, incentives, as well as access to technology can cause problems.
Surprisingly enough, neither group of firms are affected in their R&D
choice by entry liberalization. The intuition for this as follows. For firms
that sell in the domestic market alone, competitive pressures ensure that
they choose their most efficient level of R&D. With an increase in the number
of firms the competitive pressure is even greater, and thus they still select
1For a survey of this literature we refer the readers to Desai (1985).
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their most efficient technology. Hence the result follows. For firms that sell
in both the markets the argument is more subtle. In case of those firms
that choose their most efficient technology the earlier reasoning applies. For
the other firms the reason depends on the way the incentives for R&D alter
as entry occurs. It is true that increased entry causes an increased level of
competition. However, over the relevant range the shift in the profit of the
firm (as a function of the level of R&D) is parallel in nature. Thus there is
no change in the relative attractiveness of the various levels of R&D, and
hence the result follows.
In the case of export subsidies, however, the results are somewhat differ-
ent. For the firms that were using a less than efficient level of R&D, the level
of R&D increases in response to an increase in the subsidy level. However,
the firms that were already using thier most efficient technologies will not be
affected by the export subsidy. They will still be using their most efficient
technologies.
Thus we find that the results in our model run counter to the standard
arguments. Entry liberalization, despite increasing the level of domestic
competitiveness, has no effects on domestic R&D, while export subsidy,
which decreases the level of domestic competition, may increase domestic
R&D.
The results on exports and domestic output are, however, more standard.
We note that, since entry liberalization does not affect the level of R&D, the
Agarwal and Barua (1993) and the Marjit and Raychaudhuri (1997)results
apply i.e. aggregate exports, as well as aggregate output increase.
Our results also demonstrate that any possible apprehension regarding
the level of R&D choice by foreign firms is unfounded. We show that these
firms will use a level of R&D that is atleast as efficient as that used by the
most efficient domestic firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model and develops some preliminary lemmas. Section 3 derives the main
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results of this paper. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The model used in this paper is an extension of that used in Agarwal and
Barua (1993, 1994) and Marjit and Raychaudhuri (1997). We, however,
extend the model by including an R&D phase that precedes competition in
the product market.
Consider an industry consisting of N firms that produces a homogeneous
good. The firms can sell in either of the two markets - the domestic, or the
foreign. We let f(Q) denote the inverse demand function in the domestic
market. As discussed in the introduction, foreign demand is assumed to be
infinitely elastic at the level pf . We also assume that the country is protected
by a sufficiently high tariff or quota, so that imports are not allowed.2
We then introduce a few notations that we require for the analysis. Let
qid and q
i
f denote, for the ith firm, domestic and foreign sales respectively.
The total output of the ith firm is denoted by Xi, where Xi = qid + q
i
f . We
let Qd represent the aggregate domestic demand, so that Qd =
∑
i q
i
d. The
cost function of a typical firm is given by Ci(Xi), where Ci(Xi) = hic(Xi),
with hi denoting a cost parameter. In our model hi is also interpreted as
the R&D parameter.
We model the problem as a two stage game where, in the first stage,
the firms simultaneously make their R&D choices, and then, in the second
stage, they simultaneously decide on the amount to be sold in each market.
We begin by modelling the R&D stage. Assume that the R&D choice of the
firm is represented by the choice of the parameter hi from a given interval
[hi,∞). Thus the lower the choice of hi, the lower is the production cost
and the greater the level of R&D. However, doing R&D is not costless. We
2For less developed countries this assumption, atleast for some industries, maynot be
very unreasonable.
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assume that the cost of doing R&D is captured by the function r(h).
Thus the profit function of a typical firm is as follows
Pi = f(Qd)qid + pfq
i
f − hic(qid + qif )− r(hi). (1)
Notice, however, that for the second stage game in output, the level of R&D
is already given and r(hi) is now a sunk cost. Thus while analysing the
second stage game we can employ the simpler profit function
pii = f(Qd)qid + pfq
i
f − hic(qid + qif ). (2)
We then impose a few restrictions on the demand function f(Qd), and on
the two cost functions, hic(Xi) and r(h).
A.1: The demand function f(Q) is twice continuously differentiable,
f ′(Q) < 0 and sup f(Q) > pf . Moreover, f ′(Q) + qf ′′(Q) < 0, ∀q ≤ Q.
A.2: The cost function Ci(X) is twice continuously differentiable, with
hc′(X) > 0 and hc′′(X) > 0. Moreover, hc(0) = 0 and hc′(0) = 0.
Notice that the assumption that sup f(Q) > pf implies that it is worth-
while to sell in the domestic market. Otherwise all the firms would sell in
the foreign market alone and the problem becomes trivial. The condition
that f ′(Q) + qf ′′(Q) < 0, ∀q ≤ Q is the well known Hahn condition. Hahn
(1962) used this assumption to establish the global stability of Cournot equi-
librium. We, however, will use this assumption to ensure that some of our
key equations have a unique solution.
As regards assumption A.2 notice that the assumptions hc(0) = 0 and
hc′(0) = 0 together imply that the domestic sales level is always strictly
positive, and thus the equilibrium is interior. The rest of the conditions are
standard and require little explanation.
A.3: r(h) is twice continuously differentiable, with r′(h) < 0 and r′′(h) >
0.
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Thus the R&D costs are assumed to be increasing and convex in the
level of R&D, where recall that an increase in hi signifies a decrease in the
level of R&D.
We then use a standard backwards induction argument to solve this
game. We begin by considering the second stage game in outputs.
Assume that the first M firms sell in both the domestic and the foreign
market, whereas the other firms sell in the domestic market alone. Thus the
first order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium can be written as follows:
∂pii
∂qid
= f(Qd) + qidf
′(Qd)− hic′(qid + qif ) = 0, i = 1, · · · ,M, (3)
∂pii
∂qif
= pf − hic′(qid + qif ) = 0, i = 1, · · · ,M, (4)
∂pij
∂qjd
= f(Qd) + q
j
df
′(Qd)− hjc′(qjd) = 0, j =M + 1, · · · , N. (5)
Here observe that equation (4) establishes something that is useful for our
future analysis. It states that for firms that sell in both the markets, the
total output levels do not depend on the domestic demand condition, but
on the level of foreign price alone. Thus the cost levels also depend on pf
alone.
It is clear that we can combine equations (3) and (4) to write
f(Qd) + qidf
′(Qd) = pf , i = 1, · · · ,M. (6)
Now notice that equations (5) and (6) together constitute the first order
conditions for a standard Cournot game where the first M firms have the
cost functions pfXi. Thus the standard proofs for the Cournot game applies.
As usual existence and uniqueness of the solution follows from the Hahn
condition. Finally, since there are no fixed costs and since hc′(0) = 0, the
solution is interior as well. We can now summarise the above discussion so
as to obtain our first lemma.
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Lemma 1. The equation system (5) and (6) have a unique and interior
solution.
Notice that once the domestic output vector (q1d, · · · , qNd ) is uniquely
determined, we can use equation (4) to uniquely solve for the export vector
(q1f , · · · , qMf ) as well. Thus lemma 1 implies that the Cournot equilibrium is
also unique.
Our next lemma studies the impact of a change in the level of R&D on
the output levels of the various firms. We show that if a firm becomes more
efficient then the domestic sale of that firm declines, while the domestic
sales of all other firms in the economy decline. Furthermore, the aggregate
domestic sale increases.
Lemma 2. ∂q
i
d
∂hi
≤ 0, ∑j ∂qjd∂hi ≤ 0 and ∑j 6=i ∂qjd∂hi ≥ 0.
The proof of this lemma relies on equations (5) and (6) and the Hahn
condition. Since the formal proof is of little independent interest we have
relegated it to the appendix.
Notice that in equation (5) we are dealing with firms that sell in the
domestic market alone, while in equation (6) we deal with firms that sell in
both the markets. Lemma 3 below is useful as it shows that the product
market behaviour of the firms is related to their levels of R&D. Essentially,
efficient firms sell in both the markets, while inefficient firms sell in the
domestic market alone, which of course is the result we intuitively expect.
Lemma 3. Given the vector (h1, · · · , hi−1, hi+1, · · · , hN ), we can find
an hˆi such that the ith firm sells in both the markets if hi ≤ hˆi, otherwise it
sells in the domestic market alone.
The proof follows from lemma 2 and can be found in the appendix.
In any two-stage model a standard complication is that the decisions
taken by the firms in the first stage affects the choices of all the firms in the
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next stage. This usually leads to some rather messy calculations. In our
model, however, such problems are kept to a minimum as a result of the
following lemma. It states that for if the R&D level of a firm is very high,
then any further change in the level of R&D does not affect the domestic
output of the other firms.
Lemma 4. ∂q
j
d
∂hi
= 0, ∀i, j and ∀hi < hˆi.
The proof is simple. Consider the ith firm and assume that hi < hˆi.
Thus, from lemma 3, this firm operates in both the markets. Consequently,
a change in hi does not affect the equation system (5) and (6). Since, from
lemma 1, the domestic sales vector is uniquely determined by the equations
(5) and (6), the result follows.
Finally, we move over to an analysis of the R&D stage. We begin by
introducing one more piece of notation. Let q(h) solve the following equation
hc′(q) = pf . (7)
Notice that ∀hi < hˆi, we can write
dPi
dhi
= f ′(Qd)qid
∑
j 6=i
∂qjd
∂hi
+ [f(Qd) + qidf
′(Qd)− hic′(q(hi))]∂q
i
d
∂hi
+ [pf − hic′(q(hi))]
∂qif
∂hi
− c(q(hi))− r′(hi) (8)
Now consider the right hand side of the above equation. Notice that
from lemma 4 the first term vanishes, while the first order conditions in the
second stage game imply that the two terms within the square bracket also
vanish. Thus we arrive at the next lemma of this section.
Lemma 5. ∀hi < hˆi, dPidhi = −c(q(hi))− r′(hi).
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We need one final assumption before we can proceed with the analysis.
A.4: Assume that the industry consists of a single firm that can select
its technology parameter from the interval (0,∞). Then, at the optimum
choice of h, the firm participates in both the domestic and the world market.
Notice that assumption A.4 is the counterpart of the assumption that
sup f(Q) > pf . What the assumption that sup f(Q) does is to ensure
that the domestic market is not too small compared to the world price, pf .
Assumption A.4, on the other hand, ensures that the domestic market is not
too large either.
We then provide a more precise formulation of assumption A.4. Let
hˆ be the R&D level for which that marginal cost function passes through
the intersection of pf and the domestic marginal revenue curve. Clearly,
if h < hˆ, then the monopolist sells in both the markets, otherwise it sells
in the domestic market alone. Let PM (h) denote the profit function of the
monopolist where we assume that for all values of h, the domestic sales and
exports are chosen optimally. Let h∗ = argmax PM (h). Clearly, h∗ satisfies
the equation −c(q(h))− r′(h) = 0. We can now formally restate assumption
A.4 as follows
h∗ > hˆ. (9)
We then consider the shape of the function PM (h) in greater detail.
Notice that for h < hˆ,
dPM
dh
= [qdf ′(Q) + f(Qd)− hc′(qd + qf )]∂qd
∂h
+ [pf − hc′(qd + qf )]∂qf
∂h
− c(q(h))− r′(h). (10)
We then mimic the argument following equation (8) to claim that dPMdh =
−c(q(h))− r′(h).
We then impose some regularity conditions on the expression −c(q(h))−
r′(h):
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(i) The expression −c(q(h))− r′(h) is decreasing in h,
(ii) limh→∞−c(q(h))− r′(h) < 0, and
(iii) limh→0−c(q(h))− r′(h) > 0.3
Thus for h < hˆ the function PM (h) is inversely U-shaped, with the
maximum ocurring at h∗. Moreover, since hˆ > h∗, it follows from the first
regularity condition that dPMdh |h=hˆ < 0. We then examine the shape of the
PM (h) function for h ≥ hˆ. Notice that in this case
dPM
dh
= −c(q˜(h))− r′(h), (11)
where q˜(h) satisfies qf ′(q) + f(q) = hc′(q). Notice that for h > hˆ, q˜(h) >
q(h), which implies that
dPM (h)
dh
= −c(q˜(h))− r′(h) < −c(q(h))− r′(h) < 0. (12)
Hence it follows that PM (h) is an inversely U-shaped function with the
maximum at h∗.
We then revert back to the case where the industry consists of more
than one firms. Let Pi(hi) denote the profit level of the ith firm when, in
the first stage, the other firms choose their technology levels optimally and
the output levels in the second stage satisfies the Cournot conditions.4 We
demonstrate that the shape of Pi(hi) is also inversely U-shaped, with
h∗i < hˆi, (13)
where h∗i = argmax Pi(hi). Notice that for N > 1, the perceived marginal
revenue curve lies to the left of the actual marginal revenue curve, and hence
3Consider the case where the firm participates in the export market alone. Notice that
these regularity conditions essentially ensure that the R&D choice of the firm has a unique
and interior solution.
4Strictly speaking we should adopt a different notation since Pi(hi) has already been
defined in equation (1). However, since there are no chances of any confusion between the
two, we prefer to use the notation Pi(hi) and thus avoid the introduction of additional
notations.
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it intersects the pf at a lower level of output. This implies that
hˆi > hˆ. (14)
Next observe that for hi < hˆ,
dPi
dhi
= −c(q(h))− r′(h), (15)
and hence for hi < hˆ, Pi(hi) is parallel to PM (h). Thus for hi < hˆi, Pi(hi)
achieves a maximum at h∗. Clearly, this implies that dPidhi |hi=hˆi < 0.
The next step is to establish that ∀hi > hˆi, dPidhi < 0. This would establish
that h∗ is a global maximum of Pi(hi), and that hˆi > hˆ > h∗, which is the
result we are after.
Clearly, for hi > hˆi, we can mimic the argument following equation (8)
to show that
dPi
dhi
= −c(q(h))− r′(h), (16)
where q(h) gives the optimal domestic sales at the equilibrium level. Clearly,
q(h) > q(h), and thus
dPi
dhi
= −c(q(h))− r′(h) < −c(q(h))− r′(h) < 0, (17)
which completes the argument.
Summarising the above discussion we obtain the final lemma of this
section which is the result we shall use repeatedly in the next section.
Lemma 6. For all industry size N , and for all firms, the function Pi(hi)
is inversely U-shaped and achieves its maximum at h∗. Moreover, hˆi ≥ h∗.
3 The Comparative Statics Results
In this section we analyze the comparative statics results for entry liberal-
ization, as well as export subsidy. We begin by examining the case of entry
liberalization.
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Here we look at the following problem. Suppose that there are, to begin
with, N firms in the economy, out of whichM firms sell in both the markets,
while the other firms sell in the domestic market alone. Now suppose that
an additional N ′ firms enter the economy. We are interested in comparing
the R&D choices made by the firms under these two cases, as well as the
levels of export and aggregate domestic output.
We are finally in a position to address some of the issues that were raised
in the introduction. Proposition 1, to follow, is concerned with the first N
firms, i.e. those firms that already exist in the industry before entry is
allowed. The first two parts of the proposition links the product market
behaviour of the existing firms with their R&D decisions. The final part of
the proposition demonstrates that entry does not affect the R&D levels of
the existing firms.
Proposition 1. In the pre-entry situation, let the equilibrium R&D
level for the ith firm be denoted by hi.
(i) For those firms that sell in the domestic market alone, hi = hi.
(ii) For those firms that sell in both the markets, either hi = hi, or
hi = h∗.
(iii) Entry of new firms does not affect the equilibrium R&D levels of the
first N firms.
Proof: (i) From lemma 6 we know that hˆi > h∗. Moreover, since the
firms sell in the domestic market alone, hi ≥ hˆi. Since, for all hi ≥ h∗
dPi
dhi
< 0, the result follows.
(ii) For firms that sell in both the markets hi < hˆi. If hi ≤ h∗, then
hi = h∗, otherwise hi = hi.
(iii) From the above argument it is clear that the R&D choice of the ith
firm depends only on the relative values of h∗ and hi. Now notice that hi is
exogenously given, and, by lemma 6, entry by new firms does not affect h∗.
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Thus the equilibrium R&D choice is not affected.
We then consider the outcome for the new entrants. The case of interest
is where the new entrants are foreign firms from developed nations. It is
sometimes debated if the foreign firms choose an ‘efficient’ level of R&D
while entering the market of a less developed country. The way the term
efficient is defined is not very clear. We say that the R&D choice by a
foreign firm is efficient if the level of R&D is at least as high as that chosen
by any domestic firm.5 We demonstrate that in this sense the foreign firms
do choose efficient levels of R&D.
One of the reasons for arguing that foreign firms may opt for less efficient
technologies is that the domestic markets in the less developed countries are
likely to be small. This is because, it is argued, the incentive for doing R&D
is less. In the context of our model, however, we find that a reduction in the
size of the domestic market does not affect the levels of R&D by the foreign
firms.
Clearly, in the context of developing countries it is reasonable to assume
that the foreign firms have a greater access to technology, i.e. if a typical
foreign firm selects its technology parameter hf from the interval [hf ,∞),
then for any such firm hf ≤ min {h1, · · · , hN}. Under this assumption we
can show that the foreign firm will choose a level of R&D that is as efficient
as that chosen by any domestic firm.
Proposition 2. (i) Assume that for a foreign firm hf ≤ min {h1, · · · , hN}.
Then this firm will choose a level of R&D that is as efficient as that chosen
by any domestic firm.
(ii) A reduction in the size of the domestic market has no effect on the
R&D choices of the foreign firms.
5Clearly, we can also ask if the level of R&D is as efficient as the one the foreign firm
would have chosen in its own country. This question, while of interest, is not explored in
this paper.
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Proof: (i) Clearly, from lemma 6 the equilibrium choice of the foreign
firms will be either h∗, or hf . Suppose that the most efficient domestic firm
chooses h∗, then by assumption hf ≤ h∗, and the foreign firm opts for h∗.
If the domestic firm chooses hi, then the choice of the foreign firm is either
h∗, if it is attainable, or hf , if it is not.
(ii) Notice that h∗ does not depend on the domestic demand function
in any way. Thus a reduction in domestic demand does not affect h∗, and
hence the equilibrium R&D outcomes for these firms are not affected.
We then examine the impact of entry on exports and the aggregate
output, i.e. aggregate exports plus aggregate domestic output. To begin
with notice that in our model entry does not affect the levels of R&D.
Thus we are effectively back to the world of Agarwal and Barua (1994)
and Marjit and Raychaudhuri (1997). As these authors demonstrate, the
Ruffin condition is sufficient to ensure that exports and aggregate output
increase.6 Since we assume that the Hahn condition applies, and since the
Hahn condition implies the Ruffin condition, the results in Agarwal and
Barua (1994) go through.
Proposition 3. As a result of entry export, as well as aggregate output
increases.
The effect on aggregate output is of interest because it is an index of
the degree of employment in that industry. It is sometimes argued that as a
result of entry the output, and hence the employment level in less developed
countries might decline. In the context of our model, however, such fears
turn out to be baseless.
However, notice that in our model there are no fixed costs, and thus exit
6That aggregate exports will increase follows from Result V in Agarwal and Barua
(1994). That aggregate output increases follows from Results IV and V in Agarwal and
Barua (1994).
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is effectively ruled out. Since one of the main strands in the argument is
that entry by foreign firms could lead to the liquidation of some domestic
firms, our result is not as strong as it may appear at first glance. Thus all
we are claiming is that in the absence of exit by any of the domestic firms,
entry by foreign firms has no adverse effect on domestic employment.
Finally, we examine the effects of an incrase in export subsidy on the
levels of R&D. Notice that the effect of the subsidy is to increase the price
that the firms obtain from exporting. Thus, if s denotes the per unit subsidy,
and if p∗ denotes the pre-subsidy foreign price, then we can define
pf = p∗(1 + s). (18)
Clearly, in section 2 we can replace pf by p∗(1+s) and all the lemmas in
that section go through. Notice that in this case h∗ depends on s and thus
we can write h∗ = h∗(s).
Proposition 4 demonstrates that following an increase in the subsidy, s,
the R&D level in the economy may increase.
Proposition 4. Consider those firms for which the equilibrium R&D
level is initially at h∗(s). If there is an increase in the export subsidy, then
the R&D levels of these firms will increase.
Proof: Notice that in this case the first order profit maximizing condition
implies that
−c(q)− r′(hi) = 0, (19)
where q solves the equation
hc′(q) = p∗(1 + s). (20)
Clearly, as s increases, q increases. Thus, from the convexity of the r(h)
function, h∗(s) decreases.
Thus while entry has no effects on domestic R&D, an increase in export
subsidy may lead to an increase in domestic R&D.
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4 Conclusion
The basic message of this paper is that an increase in the levels of domestic
competitiveness need not lead to an increase in the level of R&D. In this
context the importent thing is the way such an increase affects the relative
attractiveness of various levels of R&D. As our analysis demonstrates, such
a change may leave the relative attractiveness of the various levels of R&D,
and thus the equilibrium R&D configuration unaffected.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by showing that
∑
j
∂qj
d
∂hi
≤ 0. Suppose to the
contrary that
∑
j
∂qj
d
∂hi
> 0. Consider the case where the cost parameter of the
ith firm declines from hi to h′i. Let the pre- and the post-change domestic
sales vector be given by (q1d, · · · , qNd ) and (q1
′
d , · · · , qN
′
d ) respectively. Then,
since
∑
j
∂qj
d
∂hi
> 0, it follows that
∑
j q
j
d <
∑
j′ q
j′
d . But then equations
(5) and (6), together with the Hahn condition implies that qid > q
i′
d , ∀i.
But summing over all firms we obtain that
∑
j q
j
d ≥
∑
j′ q
j′
d , which is a
contradiction.
We then use the fact that
∑
j
∂qj
d
∂hi
≤ 0, equations (5) and (6) and the
Hahn condition to establish that ∀i, ∂qid∂hi ≤ 0 and
∑
j 6=i
∂qj
d
∂hi
≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. First consider the case where hi is such that the ith
firm sells in both the markets. Clearly, hi does not enter equations (5) and
(6), and thus a decline in hi does not affect the domestic sales vector.
We then consider the case where hi is such that the ith firm operates
in the domestic market alone. This is characterized by the condition that
qidf
′(Qd)+f(Qd) > pf . As hi increases, from lemma 3 we can conclude that
Qd, as well as qid declines. This implies that the strict inequality still holds,
i.e. the firm sells in the domestic market alone.
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